We heuristically demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms, modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform to be used with control qubit recycling, achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single run. By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we furthermore show how the algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run. We provide concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified algorithm, as a function of the group order, the size of the search space in the classical post-processing, and the additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly.
Introduction
In a groundbreaking paper [22] from 1994, subsequently extended and revised in a later publication [23] , Shor introduced polynomial time quantum computer algorithms for factoring integers and for computing discrete logarithms in F * p . Although Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms was originally described for F * p , it may be generalized to any finite cyclic group, provided the group operation may be implemented efficiently using quantum circuits.
Shor's algorithms are significant, in that the security of virtually all currently widely deployed asymmetric cryptosystems is underpinned by either of the two aforementioned problems. The security of RSA [20] is based on the intractability of the factoring problem. Schemes such as Diffie-Hellman [4] and DSA [5] rely on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
In this paper, we analyze the success probability of a derivative of Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms, modified to enable efficient implementation using the semiclassical Fourier transform [10] with control qubit recycling [16] . We heuristically demonstrate that the derivative achieves over 99% success probability in a single run, if the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly is slightly increased compared to Shor's original algorithm, and if a limited search is performed in the classical post-processing.
The results in this paper may be used to develop estimates of the overall complexity of attacking schemes that rely on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem, and to enable fair comparisons of quantum algorithms for computing discrete logarithms.
Preliminaries
Let G under be a cyclic group of order r generated by g, and let
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Given x, a generator g and a description of G and , the discrete logarithm problem is to compute d = log g x. In the general discrete logarithm problem 0 ≤ d < r, whereas d is smaller than r by some order of magnitude in the short discrete logarithm problem. The order r may be assumed know or unknown. Both cases are cryptologically relevant. In cryptologic applications, the group G is typically a subgroup to F * p or an elliptic curve group. Given a description of G and , the order finding problem is the problem of computing r.
Miller [14] showed that the problem of finding a factor of a composite integer N may be reduced to an order finding problem in a random subgroup of Z * N . Shor [22] uses this approach to factor integers by using a quantum algorithm to solve the order finding problem.
Notation
We use the below notation throughout this paper:
• u mod n denotes u reduced modulo n constrained to 0 ≤ u mod n < n.
• {u} n denotes u reduced modulo n constrained to −n/2 ≤ {u} n < n/2.
• u , u and u denotes u rounded up, down and to the closest integer.
• | a + ib | = √ a 2 + b 2 where a, b ∈ R denotes the Euclidean norm of a + ib.
Earlier works
Shor's order finding algorithm works by inducing a periodicity in r, extracting information on the period using the quantum Fourier transform (QFT), and classically post-processing the output using the method of continued fraction expansion to recover r. Specifically, a control register of 2m qubits 1 is first initialized to a uniform superposition of all values a ∈ [0, 2 2m ), where m = log 2 r . Then [a] g is computed to a second register. When the QFT is applied to the control register, this maps the quantum system
In practice, the generalized exponentiation [a] g would be computed using the generalized square-and-multiply algorithm: Let a = a 0 +2a 1 +2 2 a 2 +. . . for a i selected uniformly at random from {0,
a 2 ] g . . . so if the second register is initialized to the identity in G, we may classically pre-compute [2 i ] g and operate with this element on the second register conditioned on a i for i ∈ [0, 2 2m ) to perform the exponentiation. A total of 2m group operations are then evaluated quantumly.
When each a i is selected uniformly at random from {0, 1}, as is the case above, the QFT may be implemented in an interleaved fashion using the semi-classical Fourier transform with qubit recycling. A single control qubit, and a few standard quantum operations, then suffice to implement the first control register and the QFT. The quantum cost of the algorithm is then entirely dominated by the cost of performing the 2m group operations.
If the system in (1) is observed, j and y = [e] g for e ∈ [0, r), are obtained with probability
where M = (2 2m − 1 − e)/r . Constructive interference is expected to arise when rj/2 2m ≈ z, for z an integer, as all unit vectors in the above sum then point in approximately the direction of the real axis. Shor uses the method of continued fraction expansion to find the unknown quotient z/r that best approximates the known quotient j/2 2m . This allows r to be recovered. If r is not prime, it may be that z and r have a common factor τ , in which case z/τ and r/τ would be found instead of z and r. To address this problem, Shor proposes to incrementally compute best approximations to the known quotient of increasing precision, and to search a small interval in τ to find candidates for the order r ∈ [2 m−1 , 2 m ). This significantly increases the success probability. Shor furthermore proposes to consider not only j, but also j±1, j±2, . . . up to some bound, to further increase the success probability.
Ekerå describes in [9] how Shor's algorithm may be simulated classically for known r. By post-processing simulated algorithm outputs, it is possible to show that Shor's algorithm, with the above post-processing, can be made to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run. Ekerå furthermore explains in [9] how a success probability over 99% may be achieved using an efficient lattice-based classical post-processing algorithm, that generalizes to higher dimensions and is applicable to Seifert's algorithm [21] for computing orders with tradeoffs.
To further increase the success probability of Shor's order finding algorithm, one approach is to slightly increase the length of the control register (see e.g. p. 11 and Appendix C in [3] , the paragraph containing eq. (5.44) on p. 227 in [17] , or the analysis in [2] ). Note however that this results in a slight increase in the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and hence in an increased quantum cost in each run of the algorithm. Another approach is to increase the search space in the classical post-processing. For instance, the lattice may be enumerated when using Ekerå's lattice-based post-processing algorithm.
Combinations of and limited tradeoffs between these two approaches are possible, as the steep reduction in the success probability that arises when the number of operations is reduced may be compensated for to some extent by searching an increased space, and vice versa.
To summarize, a few group operations may be saved, or have to be additionally evaluated quantumly, depending on the amount of work that one is willing to perform in the classical post-processing, and the minimum success probability that one seeks to attain.
Factoring integers
Shor's original motivation for developing the quantum order finding algorithm was to factor general composite integers N using the reduction by Miller [14] .
To factor N , Shor proposes to first select an integer g on 1 < g < N . In the unlikely event that g is a non-trivial divisor of N , a factor has been found. Otherwise, g is perceived as a generator of a subgroup to Z * N \{1} and its order r computed using the order-finding algorithm. Given r, Shor then uses that g r − 1 = (g r/2 − 1)(g r/2 + 1) ≡ 0 (mod N ) to find non-trivial factors of N by computing gcd((g r/2 mod N ) ± 1, N ) in a classical post-processing step. This requires r to be even. If r is odd, or if g r/2 ≡ −1 (mod N ) causing trivial factors to be found in the classical post-processing, the whole algorithm has to be re-run.
The success probability of the classical post-processing step in Shor's factoring algorithms can be increased in various ways. Johnston [11] notably points out that any non-trivial divisor of r may be used to find factors. If r has small to moderate size divisors, this has the potential to significantly increase the success probability and to allow multiple factors to be found in a single run of the quantum algorithm. Odd orders are also discussed by Lawson [13] .
Breaking RSA
If the integer N is known to be on a special form, this fact may be leveraged. Integers on the form N = pq, where p and q are distinct prime factors of similar length in bits, are of particular interest in cryptology, as the problem of factoring such integers, commonly referred to as RSA integers, underpins the security of the widely deployed RSA cryptosystem [20] .
Ekerå and Håstad [7, 8] describe how RSA integers may be factored by computing a short discrete logarithm on the quantum computer, rather than by using order finding, as originally proposed by Shor. Ekerå and Håstad's quantum algorithm has a lower overall quantum cost than Shor's order finding algorithm, in that it requires less than 3m/2 group operations to be evaluated in each run when not making tradeoffs (see the Appendix to [8] ), compared to 2m group operations in each run of Shor's algorithm. Furthermore, the probability of Ekerå and Håstad's algorithm successfully finding the factors of the RSA integer is over 99% in a single run of the quantum algorithm when not making tradeoffs (again see the Appendix to [8] ).
If tradeoffs are made in Ekerå and Håstad's algorithm, in analogy with Seifert's [21] idea for making tradeoffs in Shor's order finding algorithm, the number of group operations evaluated in each run can be further reduced to m/2+ for some small . This allows the requirements on the quantum computer to be further reduced, beyond what is possible with Seifert's tradeoffs. However, this reduction comes at the expense of running the algorithm multiple times. Ekerå has estimated the number of runs required for a success probability of at least 99% to be attained when making various tradeoffs (again see the Appendix to [8] ).
Computing discrete logarithms
In analogy with the order-finding algorithm, Shor's algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms works by inducing a periodicity in d, extracting the period using the quantum Fourier transform, and classically post-processing the output to extract d.
Specifically, two control registers, each of length m = log 2 r qubits 2 , are first initialized to a uniform superposition of all values a, b
x is computed to a third register. When two QFTs of size 2 m are applied to the two control register, this maps
to the quantum system
that is observed to yield j, k and y = [e] g for e ∈ [0, r). The two frequencies j and k are then post-processed using a classical algorithm to find d. This algorithm requires r to be known.
As in the order finding algorithm, the quantum cost of this algorithm is dominated by two sequences of m group operations. However, the implementation is complicated by the fact that the individual qubits a i and b i in the two control registers are not selected uniformly at random from {0, 1}, as required by the semi-classical Fourier transform with control qubit recycling. In this paper, we therefore consider a modified version of Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms, in which the superpositions in the control registers are uniform over [0, 2 m ). The discrete logarithm problem underpins the security of virtually all widely deployed asymmetric schemes. Notable examples include RSA 3 [20] , Diffie-Hellman [4] , DSA [5] and virtually all forms of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [12, 15] . Despite this, Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms has seemingly received less attention in the literature than Shor's order finding and factoring algorithms. In particular, we have been unable to find a tight analysis of the success probability of Shor algorithm for computing discrete logarithms, when modified as described above to facilitate efficient implementation.
Ekerå and Håstad have developed derivatives of Shor's algorithm for solving cryptologically relevant instances of the discrete logarithm problem. It is known that a success probability over 99% may be achieved in a single run of Ekerå's algorithm for computing short discrete logarithms [6, 8] , in Ekerå-Håstad's algorithm for computing short discrete logarithms and factoring RSA integers with tradeoffs [7, 8] , and in Ekerå's algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms with tradeoffs [9] . All of these algorithms may be simulated classically for known d and r, enabling the success probability of the classical post-processing to be verified.
The latter of the three aforementioned algorithms computes general discrete logarithms, as does Shor's algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem. Unlike Shor's algorithm, Ekerå's algorithm does however not require the group order to be known. If the order is unknown, it may be computed along with the discrete logarithm in the classical post-processing at no additional quantum cost. When computing discrete logarithms without making tradeoffs, Ekerå's algorithm requires approximately 3m group operations to be evaluated, compared to 2m operations in Shor's algorithm. This is because Ekerå's algorithm computes both d and r, whereas Shor's algorithm computes only d given r.
If
It should be noted that Proos and Zalka [19] discuss the success probability (see the short note in Appendix A.2) of Shor's algorithm. They state that it should be possible to achieve a success probability that tends to one, either by performing a limited classical search, or by evaluating additional group operations quantumly, making reference to the situation being similar to that in Shor's order finding algorithm. However, no formal analysis is provided. In particular, no concrete estimate of the success probability as a function of the size of the search space, or of the number of additional operations evaluated, is given.
Our contributions
In this paper, we join an additional piece to the puzzle laid out in the previous sections.
Specifically, we heuristically demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms, modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform [10] to be used with control qubit recycling [16] , achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single run.
By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we furthermore show how the algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run. It is not sufficient to only perform a limited search to achieve such a high success probability.
We provide concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified algorithm, as a function of the order r, the size of the search space in the classical post-processing, and the additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly. This enables fair comparisons to be made between Shor's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms and other algorithms.
To develop the aforementioned estimates, we derive a closed-form heuristic approximation of the probability of the algorithm yielding specific outputs. By integrating this approximation numerically, we show how to compute a high-resolution histogram that describes the probability distribution induced by the algorithm. By sampling the histogram, we show how the algorithm may be simulated classically when the logarithm d and group order r are both known, in the sense that we may generate outputs that are representative of outputs that would have been produced by the quantum algorithm, had it been executed on a quantum computer.
Assumptions and reductions
In this paper, we consider the general discrete logarithm problem in groups of known order r.
Without loss of generality, we may assume r to have no small prime factors. This is because we may determine all small factors in r classically, and use Pohlig-Hellman decomposition [18] to reduce the problem to problems in one or more small, and one large, subgroup. We may then solve the problems in the small order subgroups classically, leaving only the problem in the subgroup with large order and no small factors to be solved on the quantum computer. For this very reason r is prime in most cryptologic contexts, and hence void of small factors.
Furthermore, we may without loss of generality assume d to be selected uniformly at random on [0, r) ⊂ Z. This is because the general discrete logarithm problem can be randomized: Given g and x = [d ] g for any d ∈ [0, r) ⊂ Z, we may pick an offset t uniformly at random from [0, r) ⊂ Z, compute x = x [t] g = [d + t] g, compute the randomized discrete logarithm d = d + t = log g x on the quantum computer, and then compute d ≡ d − t (mod r) classically.
Overview
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2 we describe the quantum algorithm that upon input of a g and x = [d] g computes an integer pair (j, k). We furthermore analyze the probability distribution it induces, integrate the distribution to obtain our main results and discuss the soundness of the heuristics employed. In Section 3 we describe how the pairs (j, k) may be post-processed classically to recover the logarithm d. We explain how the quantum algorithm may be simulated for known d and r in Section 4, and summarize and conclude the paper in Section 5.
The quantum algorithm
In this section we describe the quantum algorithm, that upon input of a generator g of a group G of known order r, and an element x = [d] g, outputs a pair (j, k). In the next section, we show how good pairs (j, k) may be post-processed classically to recover d.
We use m + qubits for the two control registers, where 2 m−1 ≤ r < 2 m , and where the padding length is some small fixed positive integer constant, and proceed as follows:
1. Induce a uniform superposition over the first two control registers
Compute [a] g [−b] x = [a − bd] g to the third register to obtain
| Ψ = 1 2 m+ 2 m+ −1 a = 0 2 m+ −1 b = 0 | a, b, [a − bd] g .
Compute two QFTs of size 2
m+ of the first two registers to obtain
4.
Observe the system in a measurement to obtain (j, k) and [e] g.
Compared to Shor's original algorithm that induces a uniform superposition of r values in the first two registers, this algorithm induces a uniform superposition of 2 m+ values, enabling the semi-classical Fourier transform [10] and qubit recycling [16] to be used.
When using the generalized standard square-and-multiply algorithm to implement the two generalized exponentiations, the above algorithm requires 2 additional group operations to be evaluated quantumly, compared to Shor's original algorithm.
Analysis of the probability distribution
When the system is observed, the state | j, k, [e] g is observed with probability
where the sum is over all a, b such that a − bd ≡ e (mod r). This implies that the sum is over all a on the interval 0 ≤ a = e + bd + n r r < 2 m+ , so where we use that −t = − t for any t ∈ R. This allows us to simplify (3) to 
Up until this point, the analysis is exact. We now proceed to estimate (4) 
At the same time, if I is not selected too small, there are still many b ∈ I. Heuristically, we may then substitute δ b with a stochastic variable δ uniformly distributed on [0, 1) ⊂ R, see the note in Section 2.1.1 for further details. Substituting δ b with δ, and taking the expectation value of the sum in (5), yields
Inserting the expectation value in (6) back into (5) yields
as we may either sum over b ∈ I, or consider a constant b ∈ I, as explained above. This implies that (4) may be approximated by
by combining intervals in b to cover the full range [0, 2 m+ ). As we no longer have any dependency on e, we may sum over all r values of e on 0 ≤ e < r simply by multiplying by r. For φ = θ d − θ r d/r = 0, this yields a closed-form heuristic expression for the probability P (θ d , θ r ) of observing a pair (j, k) with angle pair (θ d , θ r ):
For φ = θ d − θ r d/r = 0, we instead obtain
We expect this heuristic to be good when φ is a small angle of size approximately 2 −m .
Notes on the soundness of the heuristic
Recall that δ b = (e + bd)/r mod 1. These numbers are on the form γ + bβ, where γ and β are two rational numbers. It is a classical result by Weyl (see [26] for Weyl's original work, see also Sierpiński [24] and Bohl [1] for independent original works, or [25] for a modern textbook reference) that if β is an irrational number then, in the limit, the numbers bβ mod 1 are equally distributed on [0, 1) (the additive offset γ clearly does not matter) when b runs over all integers. We are interested in the distribution of δ b when b is contained in an interval significantly shorter than r, but still of large size. In this situation it does not matter that d/r is a rational number, and we can obtain a finite version of Weyl's theorem when d is random. We plan to make this precise in the final version of the paper. For further details, see Section 5.1.
Distribution of pairs
In this section we analyze the distribution of argument pairs (α d , α r ) in the argument plane. Definition 2.1. Let 2 κr be the greatest power of two that divides r.
Definition 2.
2. An argument α r is said to be admissible if α r is a multiple of 2 κr .
Recall that the order r may be assumed to have no small factors, see Section 1.4. It follows that we may assume κ r = 0, which in turn implies that all arguments α r are admissible.
Claim 2.1. The number of integers j ∈ [0, 2 m+ ) that yield a given argument α r = {rj} 2 m+ is 2 κr if α r is an admissible argument, and zero otherwise.
Proof. The modulus is a power of two and 2 κr is the greatest power of two to divide r.
Claim 2.2. The number of integer pairs (j, k), where j, k ∈ [0, 2 m+ ), that yield a given argument α d = {dj + k} 2 m+ is 2 m+ .
Proof. For any given j ∈ [0, 2 m+ ) there is exactly one k that yields a given argument α d .
Constructive interference
Constructive interference is expected to arise in (8) when the absolute value of the angle
is small, that is when α d = α r d r + ∆ for some small integer ∆. This is why we developed a heuristic that is good for small φ ∼ 2 −m . As we are interested in pairs (j, k) with arguments (α d , α r ) on this form, it is useful to formally introduce the notion of B-good pairs:
Note that α d on the above form always exists for a given admissible α r and a given ∆, as j determines α r by Claim 2.1, and as α d may be selected via k for any fixed j by Claim 2.2.
For α d = α r d r + ∆, we have that (10) simplifies to 
Integrating (12) over all θ r = 2πα r /2 m+ , summed over all |∆| ≤ B, yields 2 κr r 2 2(m+ )
dδ (13) where we account for the fact that only arguments α r that are divisible by 2 κr are admissible, and that the admissible α r occur with multiplicity 2 κr , by Claim 2.1. As we may assume r not to have small factors, see Section 1.4, this is not strictly necessary. Equation (13) may be evaluated numerically to heuristically estimate how the probability mass is distributed as a function of ∆ and the padding length . As may be see in Table 1 , it is necessary to select both and B greater than zero to obtain a B-good pair with probability over 99% in a single run. If we have no additional padding bits and do not perform a search, as in Shor's original algorithm, a B-good pair is obtained with probability approximately 60% in a single run when r = 2 m − 1. If r is instead close to the lower end of the interval, say r = 2 m−1 + 1, then this probability increases to approximately 70%. Essentially, all rows in Table 1 are shifted upwards one step (as halving r is equivalent to adding a padding bit).
In practice, the order r is often randomly selected, as a prime on [2 m−1 , 2 m ), in cryptologic applications. A notable exception are the NIST P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 elliptic curve groups that have orders close to powers of two [5] to enable efficient classical arithmetic.
The logarithm d may be deterministically recovered classically from a B-good pair (j, k), assuming r to be known and a small search to be performed over ∆, see the next section. The above post-processing algorithm is identical to that originally proposed by Shor [22] except for the searches over t and multiples of r/τ . Note that this post-processing algorithm requires r to be known. If r is unknown, the quantum algorithm in [9] is more efficient than first running Shor's order finding algorithm [22] and then running the algorithm in this paper.
Simulating the quantum algorithm
By piecewise numerical integration of (13) over small intervals in α r for different fixed ∆, a high-resolution histogram may be constructed that captures the probability distribution induced by the quantum algorithm. By sampling (α r , ∆) from this histogram, computing α d = α r d r + ∆, first solving α r = {rj} 2 m+ for j and then solving α d = {dj + k} 2 m+ for k given j, we may simulate the quantum algorithm for known d and r, in the sense that we may generate outputs (j, k) that are representative of outputs that would have been produced by the quantum algorithm, had it been run on an actual quantum computer.
We have implemented the simulator in C using MPFR, with Simpson's method followed by Richardson extrapolation to cancel linear error terms. Unsurprisingly, running the classical post-processing algorithm on simulated quantum algorithm outputs recovers d, provided that the sample does not fall outside the range captured by the histogram. As and ∆ increase, the probability mass captured by the histogram tends to one, again see Table 1 .
The above is in analogy with the simulators previously developed for Shor's and Seifert's order-finding algorithms [9, 21, 22] , and for Ekerå and Håstad's algorithms for computing discrete logarithms [8, 9] , see these references for further details. Note that the fact that we may simulate these quantum algorithm does not imply that we may solve for example the discrete logarithm problem classically, as d must be known for it to be possible to run the simulator.
Summary and conclusion
We have heuristically shown that Shor's algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms, modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform to be used with control qubit recycling, achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single run.
By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we have furthermore shown how the algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run. It is not sufficient to only perform a limited search to achieve such a high success probability.
We have provided concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified algorithm, as a function of the group order, the size of the search space in the classical postprocessing, and the additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly. This enables fair comparisons to be made between Shor's algorithm and other algorithms.
To develop the aforementioned estimates, we derived a closed-form heuristic approximation of the probability of the algorithm yielding specific outputs. By numerically integrating this approximation, we showed how to compute a high-resolution histogram that describes the probability distribution induced by the algorithm. By sampling the histogram, we showed how the algorithm may be simulated classically when the logarithm d and group order r are both known, in the sense that we may generate outputs that are representative of outputs that would have been produced by the quantum algorithm, had it been run on a quantum computer.
Future work
Unlike our earlier works [6] [7] [8] [9] , in which we provided exact analyses, or approximations with associated error bounds, the analysis presented in this paper is heuristical. We are however quite confident that a bound on the error in the heuristic approximation may be derived. We are currently in the process of exploring this line of research.
